**厦门大学研究生课程教学大纲**

**XMU Graduate Course Syllabus**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 课程名称Course Title (In Chinese) | **高级微观经济学 II** |
| 课程英文名称Course Title (In English) | **Advanced Microeconomics II** |
| \*课程编码Course Number | **50010007** | 面向对象Teaching Object | **Master and Ph.D Students** |
| 先修课程或预备知识要求Prerequisite Course | **Advanced Microeconomics I and** **Mathematical Economics** |
| 课程学科分类Classification of Curriculum | □一级学科课程  First Level Discipline■二级学科课程 Second Level Discipline□研究方向课程Courses for Orientation | 课程内容分类Course Content Classification（可多选）[Multiple Choice](https://www.baidu.com/link?url=8l7GIehQd9v3tzJEcyvcjzZ706pytyb3EOABRd8MyghznnpkdEsecQJvsIgLQZ_JFlhDQWhwxWMRrmQiVmP6bLZY68fJYZXfK6ps9vnbA5trB0tc_SbKb882He2l3MYf&wd=&eqid=9e47cda200034705000000065880317e) | ■理论讲授 Lecture□实验 Experiment □实务 Practice■方法论Methodology ■文献 Literature□案例 Cases□其他Others （请注明）Please mark out. |
| 总学分/总学时Total TeachingHour/Credit | **64/3** | 实践（含实验）学分Practice(Including Experiments)Credits  | **0** |
| 教学目的与要求Course Objectives&Requirements | The aim of this course is to prepare graduate-level students with the microeconomic theory related to their future fields of interests.The requirements are 1. Homework Assignments/Class Participation
2. Midterm Exam
3. Final Exam
 |
| 教学主要内容Course Contents | Part A Game Theory: (1) Game Theory Basic Concept; (2) Information Economics (Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard)Part B Mechanism Design: Auction and Revenue Maximizing MechanismPart C Social Choice: (1) Social Choice Theory; (2) Collective Decision and Welfare. |
| 教学进度（章节内容及提要）Course Requirements(Please write according to chapters.) | Textbook: Jehle, A. Geoffrey and Philip J. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, English Reprint Edition, Person Education North Asia Limited and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, 2001.First to sixth week: Chapter 7: Game Theory (Game Theory Basic Concepts, Nash Equilibrium, Strategic-form game, Extensive-form game, Bayesian game.)Seventh to eighth week: Chapter 8: Information Economics (Information Economics: Incomplete information game, Adverse selection; Moral hazard)Ninth to twelfth week: Chapter 9: Auction and Mechanism Design (Mechanism Design: Auction and Revenue Maximizing Mechanism)Thirteenth to fourteenth week: Chapter 6: Social Choice and Welfare (Social Choice Theory, Collective Decision and Welfare) |
| 理论与实践（含实验）教学安排Theory and Practice(including experiments)Course Plan | This course introduces students to game theory, information economics, mechanism design, and social choice theory. The emphasis is on the unifying perspective that game theory offers to questions in economics, and many other disciplines including business, biology, and political science. We will introduce rigorous mathematical and economic tools in order to analyze strategic interactions between individuals, and the outcome of such interaction under both complete and incomplete information. The nature and method of strategic agents and mechanism designers to make decisions while constrained by other agents’ incentivized behavior will be analyzed. |
| 教材或参考书主要文献资料或相关数据库Required Textbook&Main Reference Book | 1. Jehle, A. Geoffrey and Philip J. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, English Reprint Edition, Person Education North Asia Limited and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, 2001.2. [Andreu Mas-Colell](http://www.amazon.com/Andreu-Mas-Colell/e/B000APVWP2/ref%3Ddp_byline_cont_book_1), [Michael D. Whinston](http://www.amazon.com/s/ref%3Ddp_byline_sr_book_2?ie=UTF8&field-author=Michael+D.+Whinston&search-alias=books&text=Michael+D.+Whinston&sort=relevancerank), [Jerry R. Green](http://www.amazon.com/Jerry-R.-Green/e/B001HPVU56/ref%3Ddp_byline_cont_book_3), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press; 1ST edition (June 15, 1995)3. [Martin J. Osborne](http://www.amazon.com/Martin-J.-Osborne/e/B001H6MGSK/ref%3Dntt_athr_dp_pel_1) and [Ariel Rubinstein](http://www.amazon.com/s/ref%3Dntt_athr_dp_sr_2?_encoding=UTF8&field-author=Ariel%20Rubinstein&search-alias=books&sort=relevancerank), A Course in Game Theory，The MIT Press; First edition (July 12, 1994)4. [Martin J. Osborne](http://www.amazon.com/Martin-J.-Osborne/e/B001H6MGSK/ref%3Dntt_athr_dp_pel_1), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press; 1ST edition (August 7, 2003) |
| 作业要求Requirementsof  Homework | 1. Assignments should be submitted on Wednesdays to TA in class.
2. Late submission without the instructor’s written permission will NOT be accepted. To get permission, contact me in advance – at least two days before the due date.
3. To be fair to all students, any late submission without permission will get zero credit.
 |
| 考核方式Method of Examination | ■笔试 Close-book Examination □口试 Oral Examination □考察 Group Work □论文 Paper □其他 Others (请注明) (Please mark out.)  |
| 成绩构成Composition of Final Grade |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Homework Assignments/Class Participation | 10% |
| Midterm Exam | 45% |
| Final Exam | 45% |

 |
| 备注Tips | Attendance:1. Instructor or teaching assistant will check attendance at least 5 times during the semester.
2. Failure to show up in class without having asked for a leave for three or more times will result in zero credit in the “homework and attendance” grade. Failure to show up in class without having asked for a leave for four or more times will result in suspension of qualification for final exam.
3. For legitimate reasons and procedures to ask for a leave, please refer to the latest policy by the Graduate Committee of the School of Economics, Xiamen University.

Exams:1. Exams are closed book.
2. If you could not take an exam (either the Midterm or the Final) on the scheduled date, please contact me at least two days before the test date. Make-up exam(s) will be of the same length but from a different set of questions.
3. Midterm exam will be held before the end of the 9th week of the semester. You will be notified at least two weeks in prior.
4. Final exam will be held during the university’s final exam week.

Academic Integrity: Students are expected to comply with Xiamen University’s Policy on Academic Integrity. Any student suspected of violating this obligation for any reason during the semester will be required to participate in the procedural process as outlined in the University Guidelines on Academic Integrity.  |

\*新开设课程可不填写课程编码，同意开设后由教学秘书编码并填入本表。