| Speaker: | Dr. Zhi Li |
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| Speaker Intro: |
University of Washington Ph.D. in Economics, Expected Completion: June 2015.
Field: Applied Micro (Game Theory, Experimental Economics), Resource and Environmental Economics.
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| Host: | |
| Description： | Abstract: This paper compares two novel uniform price mechanisms for provision point public goods to standard provision point (PPM) and proportional rebate (PR) mechanisms within a Bayesian game with private value information. The uniform price auction mechanism (UPA) collects an endogenously determined uniform price from everyone offering at least that price, while the uniform price cap mechanism (UPC) collects the uniform price from everyone offering at least that price, plus the full offer of everyone offering less. By rebating full amounts in excess of the price, the uniform price mechanisms create regions where the expected increase in payment associated with a higher offer is zero. We show that the uniform price mechanisms support Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) with higher contributions than BNE of PPM or PR, potentially increasing efficiency. We use laboratory experiments to test whether these more efficient BNE obtain, leading to higher contributions or more frequent provision. Our mechanisms outperform PR and PPM with private values: UPC generates higher aggregate contributions and provision rates than PR and PPM; UPA attracts much higher contributions, although it provides less frequently. This ranking emerges because high offers are more common (especially among high-value people) in the uniform price mechanisms, where it is low cost to venture high offers to potentially meet other high offers to support provision. |
| Time: | 2015-05-13 16:40-18:00 |
| Venue: | N302, Econ Building |
| Organizer: | WISE-SOE |