摘要：本文研究挪威一个重要养老金改革对于退休决策的影响。这个改革是2011年实施的，其主要内容是允许人们在62岁到75岁期间灵活选择退休年龄，对于选择早些退休的人们相应调低养老金以保证精算意义上养老金的数额公平。这个改革同时也废除了收入检查。之前的收入检查使得退休人员会因为劳动收入而有大比例的退休金损失。这项改革还事实上使得人们永久退出劳动力市场和开始申领政府养老金成为两个不相关的决策。在本文中，我们研究这项改革是如何影响私营部门员工的退出工作以及申领政府养老金这两个行为的。私营部门中有资格申请职业养老金的员工有很强的动机推迟退休，而那些没有资格申请职业养老金的员工则没有这样的动机。我们发现这项改革显著延迟了前一组的员工的退休，而对后一组的员工的退休则没有同样的效果。两组员工都更多的可能在62岁左右申领养老金。
注：本系列讲座使用远程会议系统传输自德国波恩的IZA总部。
Abstract: This paper studies the effect of a major pension reform on retirement behavior in Norway. The 2011 pension reform implemented flexible retirement between ages 62 and 75; introduced actuarially fair pension discounts for retiring early; and abolished the earnings test (which had imposed high implicit tax rates on labor earnings of pensioners). An important implication of the reform was that the decision to exit permanently from the labor market and the decision to claim a public pension benefits has become disentangled. In this paper we study how the reform affected the joint decision of exiting from work and claiming public pensions for private sector workers. Privatesector workers eligible to an occupational pension faced strong incentives to delay retirement while workers without an occupational pension did not. We find that the reform strongly delayed exit from permanent employment of the former group but not for the latter group. Both groups aresubstantially more likely to claim pensions already around age 62.
|
