Abstract: We estimate the general-equilibrium labor market effects of a randomized control trial in which a rainfall index insurance product was marketed to both cultivators and agricultural wage laborers in India. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of a general-equilibrium model of wage setting with weather risk, we find that both labor demand and equilibrium wages become more rainfall sensitive when cultivators are offered rainfall insurance, because insurance induces cultivators to switch to riskier, higher-yield production methods. The same insurance contract offered to agricultural laborers smoothes wages across rainfall states by reducing labor supply during droughts (when insurance payouts occur). Policy simulations based on our estimates suggest that selling insurance only to land-owning cultivators (which is the current regulatory practice in India and other developing countries) makes wage laborers worse off in some states of the world due to the increase in wage volatility, relative to a situation where insurance does not exist at all. Marketing insurance to both cultivators and the landless eliminates this adverse effect on the landless, and mildly increases average wages compared to a regime of no insurance. Note: The “WISE-IZA” seminar series is transmitted from IZA in Bonn using e-conference technology.
摘要： 本文估计了一个在印度做的随机控制实验的一般均衡劳动力市场效应。在这个实验向农场主和农业劳工提供与降雨指标挂钩的保险产品。与有天气风险的工资决定的一般均衡理论模型的预期相一致，我们发现农场主有降雨保险时劳动需求和均衡工资对降雨更敏感。这个情况下保险使得农场主更多的使用风险更高、产出更高的生产方法。当农业劳工有同样的保险时，他们在不同降雨情况下的工资更加平滑，这主要是因为干旱时他们可以得到保险赔偿因此他们的劳动供给减少。基于我们估计的政策模拟显示仅仅向土地拥有者的农场主提供保险在一些情况下可能使得农业劳动的福利受损。而在印度和其他发展中国家这是比较常见的方式。这样的方式相对没有保险的情况使得劳工的工资波动增加。如果能同时向农场主和农业劳工提供保险可以消除这种对于没有土地的劳工的负面影响，相对于没有保险的情形也同时可以提高平均工资。 注：本系列讲座使用远程会议系统传输自德国波恩的IZA总部。
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