科学研究

郑思齐：博士，清华大学恒隆房地产研究中心主任，清华大学建设管理系副主任，教授。国家自然科学基金优秀青年基金获得者，国家青年拔尖人才，并入选教育部新世纪人才支持计划。主要研究方向为城市经济学。目前致力于研究城市发展的经济机制与管理，包括城市及城市体系中“居住-就业-公共服务”的空间互动机制、土地利用与交通基础设施互动机制、城市住房市场动态演变、城市生活质量以及中国的绿色城市。相关研究成果发表在美国科学院院刊（PNAS）, Journal of Economic Literature, Journal of Economic Geography, European Economic Review, Journal of Urban Economics, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Journal of Regional Science, Real Estate Economics, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Journal of Housing Economics, Transport Policy，《经济研究》，《管理世界》和《经济学（季刊）》等期刊上，此外还发表了100余篇中文学术论文并出版两本中文专著。她获得了亚洲房地产学会、世界华人不动产学会的最佳论文奖。她是Journal of Economic Surveys和《不动产研究》的副主编，Journal of Housing Economics（住房经济学）和International Real Estate Review（世界房地产评论）的编委，世界华人不动产学会（GCREC）副秘书长，亚洲房地产学会（AsRES）理事。

 

 

孙伟增：清华大学恒隆房地产研究中心和清华大学建设管理系，博士研究生。主要研究方向是城市与房地产经济学。先后前往新加坡国立大学（NUS）、美国加州大学洛杉矶分校（UCLA）和美国麻省理工学院（MIT）进行学术访问交流。目前主要研究兴趣包括新城建设对城市和区域发展的影响和机制、基础设施和公共品投资与经济发展的互动机制、城市房价变化的内在驱动力、土地资源分配等问题。相关研究成果发表在Regional Science and Urban Economics，Journal of Regional Science，Real Estate Economics，Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics，《经济研究》，《管理世界》等国内外期刊，目前共发表学术论文19篇，同时担任英文SSCI期刊Cities的匿名审稿人。他还获得了亚洲房地产学会、世界华人不动产学会的最佳论文奖，以及《不动产研究》优秀期刊论文奖等学术奖励。

题目：Picking Winners in Industrial Policy or Playing Politics? New Estimates of the Productivity Impacts of China’s Industrial Parks

 

摘要：

Governments often invest in place based policies as they seek to encourage local economic development and alleviate income inequality across locations. In China, the central and local governments have invested large sums of money in place based industrial parks. These parks consist of undeveloped land, productive infrastructure and generous tax incentives intended to create a new economic agglomeration cluster. While a benevolent planner would invest scarce resources in those cities featuring the highest marginal productivity of investment, an alternative theory is that China’s city leaders exploit their political connections and lobby powerful Politburo members in upper level governments to set up industrial parks within their jurisdictions. In an extreme case, such “politics driven” activist industrial policy could exacerbate capital flows distortions (sending capital to low productivity areas) and thus lower economic growth relative to the counter-factual case. We construct a unique data set of political official social networks to establish whether the mayors of specific cities are connected to upper-level government officials. And empirically find that such connections raise the probability that a city is selected to receive a costly industrial park even if the city’s market fundamentals do not justify receiving such a park. In this sense, the growth impacts of industrial parks are lower for those geographic areas with weak fundamentals but a connected political mayor.We further study the economic incidence of industrial parks across cities. Our investigation offers insights about the potential for market-value-based property tax for financing urban services in order to provide infrastructure for supporting the expanding economic base and facilitating urbanization.

 

题目：Urban Agglomeration and Local Economic Growth: The Role of China’s Industrial Parks Policy

 

摘要：

Several Chinese cities have invested billions of dollars to construct new industrial parks.  This place based policy solves the land assembly problem which allows many productive firms to co-locate close to each other. The resulting local economic growth creates new opportunities for real estate developers and retailers that develop properties and stores close to the new park.  Using several geo-coded data sets, we measure the localized spillover effects of the new parks on local incumbent firm productivity (TFP), wages, retail growth, and local real estate pricing and construction. We document the heterogeneous effects of investment in parks. Those parks featuring a better synergy with the local incumbent industries, a larger share of FDI, a smaller share of State Owned Enterprises, and a greater level of co-agglomeration offer greater spillover effects. The city mayor has the political clout and the personal promotion incentives to anticipate these heterogeneous treatment effects as he chooses whether and where within the city to build the park. Across eight cities, mayors reveal through their site selection choices that they prioritize developing the city’s consumption possibilities over maximizing industrial co-agglomeration spillover benefits.