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Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation

作者: 发布时间:2021-11-16 点击数:
主讲人:Tao Chen
主讲人简介:
Tao Chen is an Associate Professor in Finance from Nanyang Business School (NBS), Nanyang Technological University. His research interest focuses on how financial market participants influence corporate policies, particularly issues related to environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) and how FinTech and financial innovation affect financial inclusion and risk.
 
He has published his work in Journal of Financial Economics (×2), Management Science (×3), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management Information Systems, Journal of Banking and Finance (×2), Journal of Corporate Finance (×2), Journal of Empirical Finance, and Accounting and Finance. His papers have been presented at major finance conferences including AFA, WFA, EFA, SFS Cavalcade, AAA, FIRS, ABFER, Finance Down Under, ECCCS, top business schools, such as MIT Sloan, NYU Stern, UPenn Wharton, Cambridge Judge, LBS, LSE, UF Warrington, UNC Kenan-Flagler, leading institutions, such as NBER, Federal Reserve Board, BIS, Luohan Academy, and covered by Financial Times, VoxEU, Lianhe Zaobao, and the Network for Business Sustainability.
 
Tao was elected to join the Board of Directors of Asian Finance Association (AsFA), and was invited to serve as an HKIMR Visiting Research Fellow by Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and a Societal Impact Fellow by NTU Institute of Science and Technology for Humanity (NISTH). He has received numerous awards, including CUHK Young Scholars Award, NBS Teaching Excellence Award, Outstanding Paper Award in Annual Conference on Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Best Paper Award in Asian Finance Association Annual Meeting, and Pioneer Award in 2020 Peak Initiative of Digital Finance Open Research. He was also nominated for the Nanyang Research Award (Young Investigator).
主持人:Xiaoran Huang
讲座简介:

This paper studies how managerial compensation is shaped by the risk preference of shareholders. Firms with a large ownership held by dual holders, institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bonds of the company, choose a less risk-inducing compensation structure. Exploiting financial institution mergers that create dual holders for portfolio companies, we identify a causal link between dual ownership and CEO compensation policies. Mutual fund proxy voting data suggest that shareholder voting is an important channel for dual holders to implement less convex contracts.

时间:2021-11-16(Tuesday)16:40-18:00
地点:The seminar will be held online
讲座语言:English
主办单位:太阳成tyc7111cc、王亚南经济研究院
承办单位:太阳成tyc7111cc、王亚南经济研究院
期数:金融经济学系列讲座2021年秋季学期第四讲(总87讲)
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