| 主讲人简介： | Ziwei Wang is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 2022. His research focuses on game theory, matching theory, and information economics. He has published an article on Social Choice and Welfare, and is actively refereeing for economics journals such as GEB, JEBO, JET, and REDesign. |
| 讲座简介： | This paper proposes a new notion of stability to study matching markets with one-sided incomplete information. A key contribution is to formulate a proper definition of uninformed agents' endogenous beliefs and a self-consistency condition on those beliefs. We define a criterion of stability for a given set of outcomes, and then iteratively apply this criterion to remove outcomes that cannot be deemed stable. Our solution concept, the set of rationalizable stable outcomes, is the limit of this procedure. We prove the existence of rationalizable stable outcomes using a fixed-point characterization. We then provide two additional characterizations of our solution concept. The first characterization links the non-equilibrium approach we pursue to the equilibrium approach pioneered by Liu (2020). The second one reveals the epistemic assumptions implicit in the iterative definition. |
