| Speaker: | John Wallis |
|---|---|
| Speaker Intro: | Professor Wallis is an economic historian who works on the interaction of political and economic development. He is particularly interested in how patterns of economic institutions change over time and specifically how patterns of economic institutions interact with political institutions in a way that make both economic and political institutions sustainable over time. Most of his work has been in American history, but over the last decade he has begun working on contemporary development problems around the world. His interests span economics, institutional economics, political economy, economic history, development economics, political science, history, anthropology, sociology, and cognitive psychology. |
| Host: | |
| Description： | Most societies are unable to create and enforce impersonal rules: rules that treat everyone the same. Most theories of the state argue that a government must possess coercive power in order to enforce rules. Particularly important for impersonal rules, the government must be able to coerce elites, who are otherwise able to avoid enforcement. We argue that it is the ability of governments to coordinate interactions that produce conditions under which elites are willing to concede their privileged enforcement of biased rules, and accept impersonal rules. |
| Time: | 19:00-21:00, Sunday, May 18, 2014 |
| Venue: | Room N303 Economic Building |
| Organizer: |